The human will debate between western and Yoruba philosophical traditions by Shitta-Bey, Olanrewaju Abdul
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC 
BY 4.0), which permits reproduction, adaptation, and distribution provided the original author and source are credited.
ABSTRACT
Discourse on human will has a long history in the Western philosophical tradition; in fact, 
this history is as old as the history of Western philosophy itself. In this regard, the dis-
course on human will remains evergreen, with changing subject-matter from one period 
to another. With regard to subject-matter, the discourse on human will has significant 
implications for other intellectual disciplines that deal with the study of human species. 
As such, the paper centres on the most recurring debate in the history of the discourse on 
human will. The paper re-examines the various controversies that have been generated 
by the question whether the human will is free or not. To date, this question has had se-
rious implications for the way we construe existence in all forms. The paper re-considers 
the debate within the bounds of two distinct thought-systems in the Western and Yoruba 
philosophical traditions. Within the context of Western thought, the paper focuses on 
doctrines that have evolved in the attempt to address or respond to the question whether 
the human will is free or not. The reason for dealing with doctrines rather than individual 
scholars is that it avoids the unnecessary repetition of arguments. The paper examines 
the works of some scholars in the Yoruba tradition who have contributed to the discourse 
on the fundamental question; however, these contributions misrepresent Yoruba thought. 
Thus, the paper argues that the question of whether human will is free or not does not 
arise in the Yoruba philosophical system. Analytical and phenomenological methods of 
research are adopted in the paper. The analytic approach is important to achieve the twin 
goal of explanation and clarity of concepts and issues; that is, the method will afford us 
the opportunity to engage with the literature and subject it to critical exposition. The 
phenomenological approach is significant as an interpretative tool for interrogating oral 
account that would properly account for the notion and conception of the human will in 
Yoruba thought.
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Introduction
In the We ern intellectual tradition, the dominant discourse on the human will is whether 
it is free or not to perform its attributed function of initiating deliberate choice and a ion. In 
other words, discourse on the human will in We ern philosophy has taken the form of a debate 
among thinkers in all fields that constitute knowledge, and has been live since antiquity; this de-
bate concerns whether or not the will is free in carrying out its attributed duties.
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Since this discourse is so dominant in We ern thought, 
it is interesting to examine Yoruba thought on the same is-
sue in order to e ablish how dominant it is within that cul-
ture. Thus it is pertinent to revisit this question as it occurs 
in We ern philosophy. However, a consideration of all the 
thinkers that have contributed to the discourse in one way 
or another is not possible because they are too numerous to 
be accommodated in this paper; therefore, rather than being 
concern with individual philosopher’s contribution to the dis-
course, we are concerned with the fundamentals that allow us 
to categorise them into various stances on the question.
In Yoruba thought, the question of whether the human 
will is free or not does not in fact arise; however, this does 
not mean that this important question eludes people. In fact, 
from our study, and as we hope to demonstrate, in contrast 
with the discourse in We ern philosophy, in Yoruba thought 
the human will is paradoxically ascribed both free and un-
free attributes. That is, a response to the question in Yoruba 
thought takes the form of quasi-indeterminism. By quasi-in-
determinism, we mean that the human will is as free as it is 
unfree, as well as possessing the additional attribute of not 
exhibiting these traits in some circumstances, namely while 
initiating decisions and a ions.
The question of the human will 
in western thought
The doctrines of pre-determinism, determinism, indeter-
minism, and non-determinism are popular in We ern intellec-
tual discourse on the human will. Principally, the question that 
each one attempts to address is whether the human will (as a 
constituent part of human ontology) is free or not to engage in 
the act of initiating deliberate choice and a ion. As a matter 
of necessity, it is important to review this question in We ern 
philosophy in order to demonstrate the claim of each doctrine. 
Pre-determinism (or fatalism) – this doctrine holds that 
“human choice and a ion have no influence on future events, 
which will be as they will be regardless of whatever we think 
or do” (Craig, 2000, p. 274). This view of pre-determinism 
suggests one of two things: either that the human will has 
been fixed from the beginning of time, or that the human will 
as ontologically conceived (as an immaterial constituent of 
human nature) is a misconception. 
Determinism (or hard determinism) – this doctrine 
claims that “human a ions and choices, without exception, 
are totally determined” (Feinberg, 1989, p. 342). This sug-
gests that the process of making decisions and taking a ions 
is predictable; that is, a decision does not occur as a first cause, 
rather it occurs as a result of the pre-existent criteria for a 
 ecific decision’s being made having been met. This doctrine 
denies that we are either in control or capable of exercising 
our will freely. 
Indeterminism (or soft-determinism) – this doctrine 
holds that as humans, some of our a ions and decisions are 
functions of human free will, while some others are causally 
constrained. Cogently stated:
It is only in the human realm that the inde-
terminist wishes to press his case. Reflex 
actions are 100 percent caused, since with 
regard to them we are not active but pas-
sive; the only area in which universal causal-
ity does not hold is in the realm of actions, 
the things we do. With regard to these ac-
tions – or at any rate some of them – no one 
will ever be able to predict them, no matter 
how such physiological and psychological 
knowledge we get about their antecedent 
conditions, because the causal principle 
does not apply to them (Hospers, 1967, 
p. 324-325).
Here it is clear that indeterminism does not argue 
against determinism completely, but only partially. In fact, 
indeterminism as outline above delineates the boundary of 
human a ions and decisions that can be determined in dis-
tinction from those that are of free will. 
Non-Determinism(or freewillism) – this doctrine is the 
“belief in freewill, which amounts to the conviction that 
human beings are endowed with the capacity for choice of 
a ion, for decision among alternatives, and  ecifically that, 
given an innate moral sense, man can freely discern good and 
evil” (Marcoulesco, 1987, p. 419). As it appears, the doctrine 
favours absolute freedom of the human will, wherein the will 
is not restrained in any form or capacity from initiating deci-
sion and a ion. 
In other words, supporters of non-determinism (or the 
freewillists) affirm that human decisions and a ions are au-
tonomous choices among a number of possibilities. Against 
this background, a fundamental tenet of this doctrine is that 
humans are aware that each and every decision they take and 
a ion they perform is a free and deliberate initiative of their 
will, rather than the result of some previous events, decisions, 
or a ions. 
The question and some 
scholars on Yoruba thought
The accounts of most scholars on Yoruba thought 
with regard to the question of whether the human will 
is free or not clearly show that they are all cases of mis-
placed articulations; in other words, these accounts contain 
many inaccuracies, including the misapplication of terms, 
mis-utilization of doctrines, failure to properly appropri-
ate conceptual equivalences in different cultures (in this 
case the Yoruba and Western cultures), flagrant imposi-
tion of categories of one culture unto another, and so on. 
Each of these inaccuracies or combinations thereof lead 
any intellectual account to be categorized as a case of mis-
placed articulation. 
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A consideration of the works of some of these scholars 
will vindicate our claim. For a start, the article “The Yoruba 
Conception of Destiny: A Critical Analysis” by Samuel Ade 
Ali is important. In the article, the primary aim is to e ablish 
that “[o]ri is a quasi-metaphysical entity which authenticates 
the uniqueness of a person in Yoruba thought” (Ali, 1994, 
p. 100); whether or not he succeeds in this objective is not an 
issue here; what is of paramount concern is the incorporation 
of We ern doctrine(s). 
According to Ali:
Ori and the idea of predestination or human 
destiny as one of the important tripartite 
elements constituting the nature of a per-
son in Yoruba […] implies the idea of causal 
explanatory paradigm in relation to human 
personality in Yoruba thought and this give 
rise to several conceptual problems such as 
the paradox of the alterable and unalter-
able destiny (1994, p. 100).
In the quote above, we see that there is a clear problem 
of conceptualization; first Ali takes ori in Yoruba thought to 
be identical with the idea of destiny as it appears in We ern 
thought. Contrary to this view, ori is not identical with des-
tiny; rather it is only a bearer of destiny (Gbadegesin, 2004, 
p. 314-315). The second problem, which is most important 
for our purposes here, is that the scholar seems to assume one 
of two things: (i) that the concept of the human will eludes 
the Yoruba people, and therefore, there is no need to demon-
strate whether there is a will or not in Yoruba thought; and 
(ii) that the idea of human will is implicit in the idea of ori.
As a result of these conceptual problems, Ali therefore 
posits that
However, I maintained that the idea of caus-
al determinism suggested by the Yoruba 
notion of destiny […] is not a rigid one that 
makes human destiny autobiographically or 
naturally unalterable. Rather, it is an explan-
atory paradigm which coheres with the real-
ity of responsibility, freewill and the use of 
reasoning faculty (1994, p. 100).
In line with this position, he posits that:
I propose and defend the claim that the 
Yoruba are better seen as soft-determinists 
rather than determinists or fatalists as some 
scholars on African studies would want us to 
believe (Ali, 1994, p. 100).
In another article titled “African Conception of Man 
and the Paradox of Alterable and Unalterable Destiny in 
Yoruba Metaphysics”, Ali posits that:
In the final analysis, it is argued that the 
Yoruba people, given their paradoxical no-
tion of human destiny, are freewillists. They 
are because their conception of human des-
tiny regards freedom as well as reason as 
two features which are not only immanent 
in the nature of man but are also basic to 
the survival of man and the actualization of 
human destiny (2007, p. 48).
In placing the two articles by the same author side-by-
side, one obvious problem is that he claims in the first that 
the Yoruba system of thought favours soft determinism (in-
determinism as explicated at the beginning of this paper), and 
then that it favours freewillism (non-determinism) in the sec-
ond. This inconsistency regards where the Yoruba stands in 
re ect to the question as treated in We ern philosophy. So 
this must have been largely due to what the scholar himself 
identified as the “paradox” in Yoruba thought. 
Ali’s inconsistency started with his failure to properly 
identify the Yoruba equivalent of the human will. In addition 
to this, he employs We ern concepts and terms to interro-
gate the Yoruba worldview, which is originally chara erized 
by paradoxes. 
In particular, the scholar thinks that ori is or embodies 
the human will. In fact, the scholar sticks to this idea and 
thinks that it is unnecessary to actually investigate whether 
the Yoruba have any conception of human will separate from 
ori or as a constituent attribute of ori. Unambiguously, we can 
see clearly that the contribution of this scholar, from a Yoruba 
per ective, cannot but be regarded as misplaced articulation 
regarding the question of whether the will is free or not. 
The articles of Balogun are also of utmost interest to 
the present work. The first is titled “The Concept of ori and 
Human Destiny in Traditional Yoruba Thought: A Soft De-
terministic Interpretation” and the second is titled “ori as the 
Sole Determinant of Human Personality in Traditional Yoru-
ba African Thought”. 
In the first article, the author’s principal concern is “to 
e ablish and strengthen the argument that the Yoruba are 
soft-determinists in their understanding of and belief in, the 
concept of ori and human destiny” (Balogun, 2007, p. 117). 
How far he achieves this aim may not be as important as the 
arsenal of We ern categories he deploys to interrogate Yoru-
ba thought regarding ori rather than human will. 
At the outset, the scholar appears to want to demarcate 
the boundary between discourse on the human will and that 
of ori in Yoruba thought, when he supposes that “ori [,] which 
is of immediate concern to us in this paper, represents the in-
dividuality element in a person” (Balogun, 2007, p. 118). This 
sounds very much like an attempt to delineate between ori 
and the human will in Yoruba thought, and this continues to 
be the case since he asserts that “ori has nothing to do with 
moral chara er, and as such it does not affect all of human ac-
tions and/or ina ions, in fact, nowhere in any of the ancient 
Yoruba scriptures is there the claim that moral chara er can 
be pre-determined by ori” (Balogun, 2007, p. 125). Without 
any further articulation, this shows that the author is at the 
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point of separating issues of ori from that of the human will 
in order to appropriately employ the We ern categories of 
fatalism, determinism, hard-determinism, soft-determinism, 
and freewill. 
However, he does not continue with this in subsequent 
paragraphs, but instead fashions the rest of the article in such a 
manner as to display misplaced articulation. This misplacement 
begins to rear its head when the author submits that ‘‘the Yoruba 
posit the concept of afowofa […] as explanation for some of the 
problems that befall a person’’ (Balogun, 2007, p. 126).
Whatever he meant to say here, we must acknowledge 
that it is true that the Yoruba people talk about afowofa (self-
caused); but the author himself fails to realize that afowofa 
does not just happen; it is in fact a descriptive word that cap-
tures the consequence(s) (particularly negative) of one’s de-
liberate decisions and a ions initiated by one’s own will. That 
is, without the human will that initiates a ion and decision 
in a person, any discourse on afowofa will not arise, because 
the concept of afowofa is an indication that a person’s will 
must have led the person to a situation or condition that is 
described as afowofa.
Furthermore, most importantly, Balogun posits that 
The Yoruba traces the course of some 
events to the individual person who per-
forms the action and not any supernatural 
force outside of man. Such actions are lo-
cated in the realm of natural and are em-
pirically observable. It is for this reason that 
people are punished for wrongdoing be-
cause they are believed to be responsible 
for their actions. This then suggests that in 
the analysis of the concepts of ori or desti-
ny, the Yoruba falls within the gamut of what 
is called ‘soft-determinism’ in metaphysical 
terms. The nature of ori and human desti-
ny in Yoruba belief is neither fatalism in the 
strict sense of it, nor hard determinism. The 
Yoruba conception of human destiny is in-
deed soft-deterministic in nature (Balogun, 
2007, p. 126).
Glaringly, this submission shows that the author himself 
qualifies the entire contents of his article as misplaced artic-
ulation. The first thing we should observe from the above is 
that in the thinking of this scholar, just like in the thinking of 
the scholar we considered first, the Yoruba concept of ori is 
synonymous with the Yoruba conception of the human will. 
Here, we think this is what is largely responsible for the mis-
use and mis-appropriation of We ern notions (or metaphys-
ical terms, as he calls them) of determinism, fatalism, soft-de-
terminism, and so on. 
Although, outside this glaring fact of misconception 
about ori and the human will, one would have expected this 
scholar to be conscious of how these We ern categories 
should apply; in other words, the way the scholar sets out 
to achieve his aim, never mind the title of the paper, suggest 
that he is aware that discourse on any of the We ern terms of 
determinism, indeterminism, soft-determinism, hard-deter-
minism, and fatalism relates to the human will.
We now turn to the second article by Balogun, because 
it “is a follow up” (Balogun, 2010, p. 1) to the first. In this ar-
ticle, Balogun’s thesis is to defend the position that “it is the 
combinations of the functions of ‘ori’ […] ‘okan’ and ‘ese’ that 
jointly determine and constitute human personality in Yoru-
ba thought” (Balogun, 2010, p. 1). 
In the course of the article he stumbles on Kola Abim-
bola’s submission that “discussing ‘ori’ (Inner head) in relation 
to moral responsibility and autonomy as some scholars have 
done is misplaced” (Balogun, 2010, p. 7). Balogun might have 
then retraced his steps and moved away from further mis-
placed articulations. That is, he finds a clear enough pointer 
to demonstrate that discourse on determinism, indetermin-
ism, and the likes in relation to ori instead of the human will 
is misplaced. 
In sum, the works of the two scholars that have been 
considered here (and others not considered) on the issue of 
whether the human will is free or not in Yoruba thought, vis-
à-vis the We ern categories of determinism, indeterminism, 
and so on, are misplaced on the following grounds: 
(i)  None of them demonstrates a clear understanding of 
the Yoruba conception of the human will. 
(ii)  No one among them thinks of dichotomizing, or 
even that there is a dichotomy, between ori and the 
human will in Yoruba thought.
(iii)  By extension, they all confuse the ontological na-
ture, status, and function of ori and the human will, 
which they see as synonymous. 
(iv)  Each one mis-utilizes We ern terminology to inter-
rogate an important concept in Yoruba thought; they 
also impose these terminologies in their exploration 
of Yoruba thought on the human will question. 
Thus they perform misplaced articulations. We now 
move on to an investigative and interpretative articulation 
of the traditional Yoruba worldview concerning the question 
of whether the human will is free or not in the proper per-
formance of its function of initiating deliberate decisions and 
a ions in the human person. 
Yoruba indigenous knowledge 
system and the question on the 
human will 
Above, we showed that the word afowofa (self-caused) 
is descriptive in the sense that it is employed in Yoruba to 
convey the negative consequences of choices arising from any 
individual’s human will. This simply indicates that Yoruba 
thought favours the position that the human will is absolutely 
free, which is called non-determinism in We ern philosophy. 
This is evident in Yoruba proverbs like
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 ‘Boti wu oloju ni i se oju e’ (One handles one’s eyes as one 
so desires) 
and
 ‘A kii pe ki omode ma d’ete, b’oba ti le da igbo gbe’ (No one 
should stop a child from having leprosy, such child only 
need to be ready to reside in the forest). 
These proverbs clearly show the Yoruba belief in 
non-determinism because each reveals the exercise of free-
will by individuals; in fact, the second proverb clearly calls 
one to exercise one’s freewill in the form of a readiness to take 
responsibility for the consequence(s) of one’s a ions and de-
cisions. If the consequence(s) of one’s a ions/decisions turn 
out to have negative effect on one, this is where the idea of 
afowofa comes in, to describe such an effect.
Further supporting the view that the Yoruba belief on 
the human will question is one of non-determinism, the odu 
ifa Obara ofun (Adewale-Somadhi, 2009, p. 55-56) gives cre-
dence to this in its claim that
Ahere oko a b’idi jeere jeere
Agbalagba ejo ni i fi idobale ara re wo’le
D’ifa fun Babalawo meta
A bu fun Olumoran mefa
Nje ta ni agba
Imoran ni a nko da, ki a to da Ifa
The hut in the farm with a big buttock
Old snake debases itself crawling 
Divined for three Babalawos
Divined for six clairvoyants
The day they staged a superiority contest in Ile Ife
Who is superior?
Ifa is superior
Decision must be made first before one consults Ifa
The above odu is a clear demonstration that Yoruba 
thought on the question is better classified as non-determin-
ism, e ecially considering the last line of the odu, which states 
that a decision must be made first before one consults ifa. 
However, there is evidence suggesting that the Yoruba 
thought also at times favours pre-determinism, determinism, 
and indeterminism; that is, evidence abounds in the Yoruba 
worldview that people think about the freedom/unfreedom 
of the human will in terms of all the other doctrines of West-
ern philosophy we have considered. 
As pre-determinism, Yoruba thought supports the doc-
trine that the human will is a constituent part of a person 
that initiates decisions and a ions that have been fixed in 
the pre-existent life of that person. Here, a person’s will acts 
out scripts that have been written for an her in a pre-existent 
world; in this sense, whatever decision and a ion is initiated 
by the human will, the outcome will always be what has been 
written. As evidence, it is common among the people to hear 
proverbs like
 ‘Riro ni ti eniyan, Sise ni t’olorun’ (A person ponders and 
thinks, but the almighty acts accordingly).
and
 Bi a gun ata l’odo, Bi a gun ata l’olo, Iwa ata ko padai’ (If 
pepper is grinded in the mortal or on the grinding stone, 
none changes the nature of the pepper).
In these proverbs, we can see that the message conveyed 
in each is that what will be will be, no matter how hard we en-
deavour to change the situation. In clear terms, the first prov-
erb states that one’s existence is designed to be lived according 
to the dictates of the designer – the Supreme Being.
In addition to the above, the odu ifa Ika oturupon (Ade-
wale-Somadhi, 2009, p. 75-76) reveals support for pre-deter-
minism in Yoruba belief in that:
Ka sangbo sansan bi aladaa
D’ifa fun ajinife omo Olofin
Ka rin hooho bi eledun
D’ifa fun Sadoyanyan omobinrin Ode Owu
Tori ki won ma ba a ji mi fe
Mo fi ide werewere se eke ile
Tori ki won ma ba a ji mi fe 
Mo fi ide gbaragada se ase ilekun
Won tun wa ji mi fe bee be…
To clear the land fast
Divined for Ajinife who was Olofin’s son
To walk about naked like an axe
Divined for Sadoyanyan, a female citizen of Owu town
To prevent being made love to without my consent
I bolted my doors with studded brass
To prevent being made love to without my consent
I bolted my doors with large studded brass
In spite of those precautions, I was still made love to
In this odu, we can see that all efforts to prevent a situa-
tion from happening do not change anything: what is design 
to happen actually happened.
But we also find indeterminism – the doctrine that the 
human will initiates some decisions and a ions freely while 
some of its decisions and a ions are caused. Yoruba belief 
also gives support to this doctrine. For instance, the following 
proverbs articulate indeterminism in Yoruba thought:
 Ti a ba wo didun ifon, a o wo r’a d’egun’ (If we are to con-
sider the sweetness of scratching the skin, we shall have 
to scratch to the bone) 
and
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 ‘Lehin oku la a je akara itufo’ (We consume burial’s bean-
cake only after the death of someone).
Clearly indicated in the proverbs above is that individuals 
are free to act as desired, but that there are factors that limit the 
exercise of this freedom to act. As a point of clarification, the 
first proverb indicates that there is a limit to our freedom while 
the second additionally conveys the message that it is not in our 
purview to take decisions or a ions in some situations. 
Furthermore, the odu ifa Ofun Nogbe (Adewale-So-
madhi, 2009, p. 111-112) clearly reveals that Yoruba thought 
supports indeterminism. This is because the odu shows that 
at some points in time in this material world, individual will 
initiates decisions and a ions that are caused, and at some 
other points it explores the freedom associated with it. Ac-
cording to this odu:
Ti a ba wi fun ni
Ti a ba gbo
Aye a ma a ye ni
Ti a ba wi fun n
Ti a ba gba
Aye a ma a ye ni
Awi igbo
Afo igba
Babalawo ode lo se ifa fun ode
Ode nre gbo ije, eluju ije
Won ni k’oru bo
Ki o le r’ere mu bo
Ki o ma mu oti
Keke-l’oju omo ode Egba
Alabaja l’orun omo ode Esa
Porogun matuyeri omo odo oluweri
Oni jaye nre le ijaye
Orogun ile f ’awo mi lo mi
When one is warned
And one listens and accepts the warning
Life will be easy and comfortable for one
When one is warned 
And one re ects and obeys the warning
Life will be easy and comfortable for one
Refusal to listen 
Refusal to heed warning
Ode’s Babalawo gave him a fixed ifa medicine
 When ode was going to the forest for his usual seven 
days hunting expedition
He was advised to make sacrifice
So that he would be blessed from the expedition
He was forbidden liquor
Tribal-marks-on-the-face, citizen of Egba
Tribal-marks-on-the-neck, citizen of Ijesa
Porogun matuyeri child of river goddess
Ijaye citizen is going back to Ijaye
Senior wife revealed the secret of my true identity
In support of determinism – the view that all our ac-
tions and decisions are the results of previous knowable caus-
es, Yoruba belief also claims that
 Aiku ekiri, a o ko le fi awo re se gbedu’ (Without the death 
of Ekiri [a kind of animal], no one uses its’ skin to con-
struct the gbedu [a kind of drum])
and
‘Adaniloro f’agbara ko ni’ (The wickedness suffered by 
someone make her a stronger person).
These proverbs advance the message that individuals’ 
conduct and decisions derive from determinable causes. This 
is e ecially so in the case of the second proverb because it is 
impregnated with the idea that the effect of being strong results 
from the cause of the wickedness that one suffers in the hands 
of others. Also in support of this view, the odu ifa Ogunda irete 
(Adewale-Somadhi, 2009, p. 66-65)  eaks thus:
Kukunduku a b’ewe gerugeru
Opo oogun a gun’ mo galegale
Bi o ba l’opoo ogun, bi o ba l’eke
Eke o ni je o je
Inuire je ju ewe lo
D’ifa fun Ooni Alanak’esuu
Eyi ti ko gbudo ko ohun ifa sile
Sweet potato with fresh leaves
 Possession and knowledge of too many charms and 
 ells intoxicate
 If you have potent charms and  ells and you are dis-
honest
 Your dishonesty will render the charms and  ells im-
potent
 Honesty and goodwill work better than charms and 
 ells
Divined for the king Ooni Alanak’esuu
Who must follow ifa’s advice and injunctions.
We can see that Yoruba thought is so rich that it also 
gives support to determinism as a metaphysical doctrine in 
relation to the question of human will. On this note, we may 
go on and on providing evidence from Yoruba thought that 
supports any of these doctrines in We ern philosophy on the 
question whether the human will is free or not; and this may 
lead any onlooker to conclude that thought on the issue is in-
consistent. 
We must point out here that it is not a crime for a cul-
tural intellectual tradition to be embedded with evidence and 
support for multiple doctrines on an issue. The idea of per-
sonhood (see Makinde, 2007; Akintola, 1999; Oladipo, 1992; 
Awolalu and Dopamu, 2005 [1979]; Abimbola, 1971; Idowu, 
1962, and others) in Yoruba thought has a useful purpose to 
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serve in this sense: the conception of the freedom/unfreedom 
of the human will in Yoruba thought remains salient and par-
adoxical in this worldview.
The above observation notwithstanding, there is evi-
dence in Yoruba thought that can give credence to all known 
doctrines in We ern philosophy; and in spite of the fact that 
the initiation of decisions and a ions in individuals remains 
a paradox (both in the pre-existent and physical existence of 
a person), the Yoruba position on the question can best be de-
scribed as quasi-indeterminism.
By quasi-indeterminism, I mean that the Yoruba belief 
is neither for nor against the (im)possibility of a free/unfree 
human will; in other words, the Yoruba belief is devoid of 
this question. This contention is explicitly e ablished by the 
Yoruba expression that Aditulaiye, meaning life is paradoxical 
(or is a paradox). 
The paradoxes of life, as held in Yoruba thought, explain 
the intermittent shifts of the Yoruba position on the question 
of whether the human will is free or not. These alternatives on 
the question of the human will in the material world (even in 
the pre-existent life of human beings) are not combinable in 
any of the available doctrines in We ern philosophy. There-
fore, by quasi-indeterminism, we mean that the elements of 
freedom and unfreedom (as well as neither) chara erize the 
human will question in Yoruba thought. 
Conclusion
We have examined the human will question as it exists 
in We ern philosophy by demonstrating the various meta-
physical doctrines that chara erized the discourse. We  e-
cifically articulated that in the We ern intellectual tradition 
the question is constituted by four main doctrines: pre-de-
terminism (or fatalism), determinism (or hard determinism), 
indeterminism (or soft determinism), and non-determinism 
(or freewillism).
In the paper, we demonstrated that some of the known 
analyses of the Yoruba per ective are misleading. These con-
tributions are misleading because scholars have mis-equated 
the human will with ori in Yoruba thought.
In this connection, we are able to show that the idea of 
the human will is not elusive in Yoruba thought; and ori is 
not the Yoruba equivalent of the human will (see Shitta-Bey, 
2014, for the Yoruba equivalent and conception of the human 
will). In sum, the paper has shown that the Yoruba belief in 
the human will question cannot be pinned down to any of the 
known metaphysical doctrines in We ern philosophy; rather 
the Yoruba belief on the question is best categorized as qua-
si-indeterminism.
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